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Abstract
We prove a theorem which shows that a collection of experimental data of probabilistic weights re-
lated to decisions with respect to situations and their disjunction cannot be modeled within a classical
probabilistic weight structure in case the experimental data contain the effect referred to as the ‘disjunc-
tion effect’ in psychology. We identify different experimental situations in psychology, more specifically
in concept theory and in decision theory, and in economics (namely situations where Savage’s Sure-Thing
Principle is violated) where the disjunction effect appears and we point out the common nature of the
effect. We analyze how our theorem constitutes a no-go theorem for classical probabilistic weight struc-
tures for common experimental data when the disjunction effect is affecting the values of these data. We
put forward a simple geometric criterion that reveals the non classicality of the considered probabilistic
weights and we illustrate our geometrical criterion by means of experimentally measured membership
weights of items with respect to pairs of concepts and their disjunctions. The violation of the classi-
cal probabilistic weight structure is very analogous to the violation of the well-known Bell inequalities
studied in quantum mechanics. The no-go theorem we prove in the present article with respect to the
collection of experimental data we consider has a status analogous to the well known no-go theorems for
hidden variable theories in quantum mechanics with respect to experimental data obtained in quantum
laboratories. For this reason our analysis puts forward a strong argument in favor of the validity of using
a quantum formalism for modeling the considered psychological experimental data as considered in this
paper.
1 Introduction
There exists an intensive ongoing research activity focusing on the use of the mathematical formalism of
quantum mechanics to model situations in cognition and economics [1, 2, 3, 4]. Our group at the Leo Apostel
Center in Brussels has played a role in the initiation of this research domain [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14],
and is still actively engaged in it [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
In the present article we make use of insights and techniques developed in the foundations of quantum
mechanics to investigate whether a specific collection of experimental data can be modeled by means of
a classical theory, or whether a more general theory is needed, eventually a quantum theory. For decades
intensive research has been conducted focussing on the very question, since physicists wanted to know whether
quantum mechanics itself could be substituted by a classical theory. This body of research is traditionally
referred to as ‘the hidden variable problem of quantum mechanics’, because indeed such a classical theory
giving rise to the same predictions as quantum mechanics would be a theory containing ‘hidden variables’, to
account for classical determinism on a hidden not necessarily manifest level. The presence of quantum-type
probabilities would occur as a consequence of the lack of knowledge of these hidden variables on the manifest
level. Physicists had already encountered such a situation before, namely classical statistical mechanics is
a hidden variable theory for thermodynamics, i.e. the positions and velocities of the molecules of a given
substance are hidden variables when the thermodynamic description level of the substance is the manifest
level [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47]. John von
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Neumann proved the first no-go theorem for the existence of hidden variables for quantum mechanics [23],
and this was followed by the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox proposal [24]. Critical investigations
with respect to both von Neumann’s no-go theorem and the EPR paradox were performed by Bell [28, 30].
Then followed the proposal of an effective hidden variable theory, nowadays called ‘Bohm’s theory’, [29],
elaborations of von Neumann’s theorem, i.e. further investigations from a structural perspective [26, 27, 31,
36, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47], and extensive discussions about several aspects of the problem [32, 33, 34, 46]. In
the seventies the experimentalist became interested, and this lead to new developments, e.g. the sharpening
of notions such as locality, separability, etc.... But most of all, quantum mechanics was now confirmed as
a profoundly reliable physical theory, even when scrutinized under all types of aspects where failure could
be expected in a plausible way [35, 37, 39, 40]. In the eighties, it was shown, step by step, that by focusing
on the mathematical structure of the probability model used to model experimental data, it was possible
to distinguish between data that are quantum (more correctly ‘non-classical’, in the sense of not allowing a
modeling within a classical Kolmogorovian probability model [41]), and data that are classical (hence can
be modeled within a Kolmogorovian probability model) [38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47]. One of the aspects of this
hidden variable research, which from the foundations of quantum mechanics point of view is definitely of
more universal importance and value, is that the results with respect to the characterization of a set of
experimental data, i.e. whether these data can be modeled within a classical theory or not, do not depend
on whether these data are obtained from measurements in a physics laboratory. For sets of data whether
obtained from experiments in psychology or economics (or in any other domain of science) the same analysis
can be made, and the same techniques of characterization of these data can be employed.
We have already investigated in this way data that were gathered by experiments measuring membership
weights of an item with respect to two concepts and the conjunction of these two concepts [48]. These exper-
imental data provide experimental evidence for a quantum structure in cognition [17]. The deviation of what
a classical probability theory would provide in modeling these experimental data was called ‘overextension’
in concept research circles [48]. Many experiments by different concept researchers have measured the pres-
ence of ‘overextension’ for the conjunction of concepts [49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54], such that the ‘deviation from
classicality’ is experimentally well documented and abundant. There is a correspondence between ‘overex-
tension’ for typicality and membership weight values for the conjunction of concept, and what in decision
theory is referred to as ‘the conjunction fallacy’ [55, 56]. In the present article we want to concentrate on the
‘disjunction’, and ‘how deviations from classicality appear when the disjunction is at play’. The experimen-
tal data that we consider as our elements of study are the results of measurements of membership weights
of items with respect to pairs of concepts and their disjunction [57]. In an analogous way like conjunction
deviations from classicality in concept theories relate to the conjunction fallacy in decision theory, there is
the well studied disjunction effect in decision theory which corresponds to these disjunction deviations in
concept theories [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69]. In economics too, an effect similar to this
disjunction effect was observed, more specifically in situations where Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle [70], a
fundamental hypothesis of classical economic theory, is violated. We refer here to the Allais and Ellsberg
paradoxes [71, 72].
Before putting forward a simple criterion and also a geometric interpretation of it in the next section, we
would like to mention that the disjunction effect in decision theory has been modeled quantum mechanically
by several authors [73, 74, 75]. The disjunction effect, as it appears for the membership weights of items
with respect to pairs of concepts and their disjunction, was modeled explicitly by the quantum mechanical
formalism in our Brussels group [14, 15, 19]. The result of the present article, namely that the disjunction
effect cannot be modeled classically, supports the quantum models that have been put forward for it.
2 Classical and non classical membership weights for concepts
The ‘disjunction’ experiments we want to focus on in the present article were performed with the aim
of measuring deviations for membership weights of items with respect to concepts from how one would
expect such membership weights to behave classically [57]. For example, the concepts Home Furnishings
and Furniture and their disjunction ‘Home Furnishings or Furniture’ are considered. With respect to this
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pair, the item Ashtray is considered. Subjects rated the membership weight of Ashtray for the concept
Home Furnishings as 0.7 and the membership weight of the item Ashtray for the concept Furniture as 0.3.
However, the membership weight of Ashtray with respect to the disjunction ‘Home Furnishings or Furniture’
was rated as only 0.25, i.e. less than either one of the weights assigned for both concepts separately. This
means that subjects found Ashtray to be ‘less strongly a member of the disjunction ‘Home Furnishings or
Furniture’ than they found it to be a member of the concept Home Furnishings alone or a member of the
concept Furniture alone’. If one thinks intuitively about the ‘logical’ meaning of a disjunction, then this
is an unexpected result. Indeed, if somebody finds that Ashtray belongs to Home Furnishings, they would
be expected to also believe that Ashtray belongs to ‘Home Furnishings or Furniture’. The same holds for
Ashtray and Furniture. Hampton called this deviation (this relative to what one would expect according to
a standard classical interpretation of the disjunction) ‘underextension’ [57].
A typical experiment testing the effect described above proceeds as follows. The tested subjects are asked
to choose a number from the following set: {−3,−2,−1, 0, +1,+2,+3}, where the positive numbers +1, +2
or +3 mean that they consider ‘the item to be a member of the concept’ and the typicality of the membership
increases with an increasing number. Hence +3 means that the subject who attributes this number considers
the item to be a very typical member, and +1 means that he or she considers the item to be a not so typical
member. The negative numbers indicate non-membership, again in increasing order, i.e. -3 indicates strong
non-membership, and -1 represents weak non-membership. Choosing 0 indicates the subject is indecisive
about the membership or non-membership of the item. Subjects were asked to repeat the procedure for all
the items and concepts considered. Membership weights were then calculated by dividing the number of
positive ratings by the number of non-zero ratings.
Considering again the case of Ashtray as an item and its membership with respect to the concepts Home
Furnishings and Furniture and their disjunction. As the experiments are conceived, each individual subject
will decide for Ashtray whether it is a member or not a member of respectively Home Furnishings, Furniture
and ‘Home Furnishings or Furniture’. Suppose that there are n subjects participating in the experiment.
There is a way to express what we mean intuitively by ‘classical behavior’. Indeed, what we would ‘not’
like to happen is that a subject, decides Ashtray to be a member of Home Furnishings, but not a member
of Home Furnishings or Furniture. If a subject would make such type of decision, then this would be in
direct conflict with the meaning of the disjunction. However, in the case of Ashtray, since 0.7 × n subjects
have decided that Ashtray is a member of Home Furnishings and only 0.25 × n subjects have decided it to
be a member of ‘Home Furnishings or Furniture’, this means that at least 0.55× n subjects have taken this
decision in direct conflict with the meaning of the disjunction. In case n = 100, this means 55 subjects (more
than half) have done so.
Suppose we introduce the following notation, and indicate with A1 the first considered concept, hence
Home Furnishings, and with µ(A1) the membership weight of item X, hence Ashtray, with respect to A1.
This means that for our example we have µ(A1) = 0.7. With A2 we denote the second considered concept,
hence Furniture, and with µ(A2) the membership weight of item X, hence Ashtray, with respect to A2.
This means that for our example we have µ(A2) = 0.3. With ‘A1 or A2’ we denote the disjunction of both
concepts A1 and A2, hence ‘Home Furnishings or Furniture’, and with µ(A1 or A2) the membership weight
of item X, hence Ashtray, with respect to ‘A1 or A2’.
We can easily see that the non classical effect we analyzed above cannot happen in case the following
two inequalities are satisfied
µ(A1) ≤ µ(A1 or A2) (1)
µ(A2) ≤ µ(A1 or A2) (2)
and we observe indeed that both inequalities are violated for our example of Ashtray with respect to Home
Furnishings and Furniture.
There is another issue which we do not want to happen, and this one is somewhat more subtle. To
illustrate it, we consider another example of the experiments, namely the item Olive, with respect to the
pair of concepts Fruits and Vegetables and their disjunction ‘Fruits or Vegetables’. The respective membership
weights were measured to be µ(A1) = 0.5, µ(A2) = 0.1 and µ(A1 or A2) = 0.8. Obviously inequalities (1)
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and (2) are both satisfied for this example. Let us suppose again that there are n subjects participating in
the experiment. Then 0.5× n subjects have decided that Olive is a member of Fruits, and 0.1× n subjects
have decided that Olive is a member of Vegetables, while 0.8×n subjects have decided that Olive is a member
of ‘Fruits or Vegetables’. However, at maximum 0.5×n+ 0.1×n = 0.6×n subjects have decided that Olive
is a member of Fruits ‘or’ is a member of Vegetables. This means that a minimum of 0.4× n subjects have
decided that Olive is neither a member of Fruits nor a member of Vegetables. But 0.8 × n subjects have
decided that Olive is a member of ‘Fruits or Vegetables’. This means that a minimum of 0.2 × n subjects
have decided that Olive ‘is not’ a member of Fruits, and also ‘is not’ a member of Vegetables, but ‘is’ a
member of ‘Fruits or Vegetables’. The decision made by these 0.2 × n subjects, hence 20 in case n = 100,
goes directly against the meaning of the disjunction. An item becoming a member of the disjunction while
it is not a member of both pairs is completely non classical. We can easily see that this second type of non
classicality cannot happen in case the following inequality is valid
µ(A1 or A2) ≤ µ(A1) + µ(A2) (3)
and indeed this inequality is violated by the example of Olive with respect to Fruits and Vegetables. One of
the authors has derived in earlier work the three inequalities (1), (2) and (3) as a consequence of a different
type of requirement, namely the requirement that the membership weights are in their most general form
representations of mathematical normed measures (see section 1.4, Theorem 4 and Appendix B of [15], and
Theorem 4.1 of the present article). The items that deviated from classicality by violating one or both of the
inequalities (1) and (2) were called ∆-type non classical items. The items that deviated from classicality by
violating inequality (3) were called k-type non classical items. An explicit quantum model was constructed
for both types of non classical items [15]. In the present paper we consider the general situation of n concepts
and disjunctions of pairs of these n concepts, and we introduce the corresponding definition for classicality.
We will additionally derive a simple geometrical criterion to verify whether the membership weights of an
item with respect to a set of concepts and disjunctions of pairs of them can be modeled classically or not.
Table 1 represents the items and pairs of concepts tested by Hampton [57] which we will use as experimental
data to illustrate the analysis put forward in the present article.
We consider n concepts A1, A2, . . . , An and membership weights µ(Ai) of an item X with respect to each
concept Ai, and also membership weights µ(Ai or Aj) of this item X with respect to the disjunction of
concepts Ai and Aj . It is not necessary that membership weights of the item X are determined with respect
to each one of the possible pairs of concepts. Hence, to describe this situation formally, we consider a set
S of pairs of indices S ⊆ {(i, j) | i < j; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n} corresponding to those pairs of concepts for which
the membership weights of the item X have been measured with respect to the disjunction of these pairs.
Hence, the following set of membership weights have been experimentally determined
pi = µ(Ai) i = 1, 2, . . . , n; pi∨j = µ(Ai or Aj) (i, j) ∈ S (4)
Definition 2.1 (Classical Disjunction Data) We say that the set of membership weights of an item X
with respect to concepts is a ‘classical disjunctive set of membership weights’ if it has a normed measure
representation. Hence if there exists a normed measure space (Ω, σ(Ω), P ) with EA1 , EA2 , . . . , EAn ∈ σ(Ω)
elements of the event algebra, such that
pi = P (EAi) i = 1, 2, . . . , n; pi∨j = P (EAi ∪ EAj ) (i, j) ∈ S (5)
A normed measure P is a function defined on a σ-algebra σ(Ω) over a set Ω and taking values in the interval
[0, 1] such that the following properties are satisfied: (i) The empty set has measure zero, i.e. P (∅) = 0;
(ii) Countable additivity or σ-additivity: if E1, E2, E3, . . . is a countable sequence of pairwise disjoint
sets in σ(Ω), the measure of the union of all the Ei is equal to the sum of the measures of each Ei, i.e.
P (
⋃∞
i=1Ei) =
∑∞
i=1 P (Ei); (iii) The total measure is one, i.e. P (Ω) = 1. The triple (Ω, σ(Ω), P ) is called a
normed measure space, and the members of σ(Ω) are called measurable sets. A σ-algebra over a set Ω is a
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Table 1: The eight pairs of concepts and items of experiment 2 in [57]. µ(A1), µ(A2) and µ(A1orA2) are
respectively the measured membership weights of each item with respect to the concepts A1, A2 and their
disjunction A1orA2. The non classical items are labeled by q and the classical items by c.
µ(A1) µ(A2) µ(A1orA2) µ(A1) µ(A2) µ(A1orA2)
A1=Home Furnishing, A2=Furniture A1=Spices, A2=Herbs
Mantelpiece q 0.8 0.4 0.75 Molasses c 0.4 0.05 0.425
Window Seat q 0.9 0.9 0.8 Salt q 0.75 0.1 0.6
Painting q 0.9 0.5 0.85 Peppermint c 0.45 0.6 0.6
Light Fixture q 0.8 0.4 0.775 Curry q 0.9 0.4 0.75
Kitchen Count q 0.8 0.55 0.625 Oregano q 0.7 1 0.875
Bath Tub c 0.5 0.7 0.75 MSG q 0.15 0.1 0.425
Desk Chair c 0.1 0.3 0.35 Chili Pepper q 1 0.6 0.95
Shelves c 1 0.4 1 Mustard q 1 0.8 0.85
Rug c 0.9 0.6 0.95 Mint c 1 0.8 0.925
Bed c 1 1 1 Cinnamon c 1 0.4 1
Wall-Hangings c 0.9 0.4 0.95 Parsley c 0.5 0.9 0.95
Space Rack q 0.7 0.5 0.65 Saccharin q 0.1 0.01 0.15
Ashtray q 0.7 0.3 0.25 Poppyseeds c 0.4 0.4 0.4
Bar q 0.35 0.6 0.55 Pepper c 0.9 0.6 0.95
Lamp q 1 0.7 0.9 Turmeric q 0.7 0.45 0.675
Wall Mirror q 1 0.6 0.95 Sugar q 0 0 0.2
Door Bell c 0.5 0.1 0.55 Vinegar q 0.1 0.01 0.35
Hammock q 0.2 0.5 0.35 Sesame Seeds c 0.35 0.4 0.625
Desk c 1 1 1 Lemon Juice q 0.1 0.01 0.15
Refrigerator q 0.9 0.7 0.575 Chocolate c 0 0 0
Park Bench q 0 0.3 0.05 Horseradish q 0.2 0.4 0.7
Waste Paper Basket q 1 0.5 0.6 Vanilla q 0.6 0 0.275
Sculpture c 0.8 0.4 0.8 Chires q 0.6 1 0.95
Sink Unit q 0.9 0.6 0.6 Root Ginger q 0.7 0.15 0.675
A=Hobbies, B=Games A=Instruments, B=Tools
Gardening c 1 0 1 Broom q 0.1 0.7 0.6
Theatre-Going c 1 0 1 Magnetic Compass c 0.9 0.5 1
Archery q 1 0.9 0.95 Tuning Fork c 0.9 0.6 1
Monopoly c 0.7 1 1 Pen-Knife q 0.65 1 0.95
Tennis c 1 1 1 Rubber Band q 0.25 0.5 0.25
Bowling c 1 1 1 Stapler c 0.85 0.8 0.85
Fishing c 1 0.6 1 Skate Board q 0.1 0 0
Washing Dishes q 0.1 0 0.15 Scissors q 0.85 1 0.9
Eating Ice-Cream Cones q 0.2 0 0.1 Pencil Eraser q 0.4 0.7 0.45
Camping q 1 0.1 0.9 Tin Opener c 0.9 0.9 0.95
Skating q 1 0.6 0.95 Bicycle Pump q 1 0.9 0.7
Judo q 1 0.7 0.8 Scalpel q 0.8 1 0.925
Guitar Playing c 1 0 1 Computer q 0.6 0.8 0.6
Autograph Hunting q 1 0.2 0.9 Paper Clip q 0.3 0.7 0.6
Discus Throwing q 1 0.75 0.7 Paint Brush c 0.65 0.9 0.95
Jogging q 1 0.4 0.9 Step Ladder q 0.2 0.9 0.85
Keep Fit q 1 0.3 0.95 Door Key q 0.3 0.1 0.95
Noughts q 0.5 1 0.9 Measuring Calipers q 0.9 1 0.9
Karate q 1 0.7 0.8 Toothbrush c 0.4 0.4 0.5
Bridge c 1 1 1 Sellotape q 0.1 0.2 0.325
Rock Climbing q 1 0.2 0.95 Goggles q 0.2 0.3 0.15
Beer Drinking q 0.8 0.2 0.575 Spoon q 0.65 0.9 0.7
Stamp Collecting c 1 0.1 1 Pliers c 0.8 1 1
Wrestling q 0.9 0.6 0.625 Meat Thermometer c 0.75 0.8 0.9
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µ(A1) µ(A2) µ(A1orA2) µ(A1) µ(A2) µ(A1orA2)
A1=Pets, A2=Farmyard Animals A1=Fruits, A2=Vegetables
Goldfish q 1 0 0.95 Apple c 1 0 1
Robin c 0.1 0.1 0.1 Parsley q 0 0.2 0.45
Blue-Tit c 0.1 0.1 0.1 Olive q 0.5 0.1 0.8
Collie Dog c 1 0.7 1 Chili Pepper c 0.05 0.5 0.5
Camel q 0.4 0 0.1 Broccoli q 0 0.8 1
Squirrel q 0.2 0.1 0.1 Root Ginger q 0 0.3 0.55
Guide Dog for the Blind q 0.7 0 0.9 Pumpkin c 0.7 0.8 0.925
Spider c 0.5 0.35 0.55 Raisin q 1 0 0.9
Homing Pig q 0.9 0.1 0.8 Acorn q 0.35 0 0.4
Monkey q 0.5 0 0.25 Mustard q 0 0.2 0.175
Circus Horse q 0.4 0 0.3 Rice q 0 0.4 0.325
Prize Bull q 0.1 1 0.9 Tomato c 0.7 0.7 1
Rat q 0.5 0.7 0.4 Coconut q 0.7 0 1
Badger q 0 0.25 0.1 Mushroom q 0 0.5 0.9
Siamese Cat q 1 0.1 0.95 Wheat q 0 0.1 0.2
Race Horse c 0.6 0.25 0.65 Green Pepper c 0.3 0.6 0.8
Fox q 0.1 0.3 0.2 Watercress q 0 0.6 0.8
Donkey q 0.5 0.9 0.7 Peanut c 0.3 0.1 0.4
Field Mouse q 0.1 0.7 0.4 Black Pepper c 0.15 0.2 0.225
Ginger Tom-Cat q 1 0.8 0.95 Garlic q 0.1 0.2 0.5
Husky in Sledream q 0.4 0 0.425 Yam c 0.45 0.65 0.85
Cart Horse q 0.4 1 0.85 Elderberry q 1 0 0.8
Chicken q 0.3 1 0.95 Almond q 0.2 0.1 0.425
Doberman Guard Dog q 0.6 0.85 0.8 Lentils q 0 0.6 0.525
A=Sportswear, B=Sports Equipment A=Household Appliances, B=Kitchen Utensils
American Foot c 1 1 1 Fork q 0.7 1 0.95
Referee’s Whistle q 0.6 0.2 0.45 Apron c 0.3 0.4 0.5
Circus Clowns q 0 0 0.1 Hat Stand q 0.45 0 0.3
Backpack c 0.6 0.5 0.6 Freezer q 1 0.6 0.95
Diving Mask q 1 1 0.95 Extractor Fan q 1 0.4 0.9
Frisbee q 0.3 1 0.85 Cake Tin c 0.4 0.7 0.95
Sunglasses q 0.4 0.2 0.1 Carving Knife c 0.7 1 1
Suntan Lotion q 0 0 0.1 Cooking Stove c 1 0.5 1
Gymnasium q 0 0.9 0.825 Iron q 1 0.3 0.95
Motorcycle Helmet q 0.7 0.9 0.75 Food Processor c 1 1 1
Rubber Flipper c 1 1 1 Chopping Board q 0.45 1 0.95
Wrist Sweat q 1 1 0.95 Television q 0.95 0 0.85
Golf Ball c 0.1 1 1 Vacuum Cleaner c 1 0 1
Cheerleaders c 0.3 0.4 0.45 Rubbish Bin c 0.5 0.5 0.8
Linesman’s Flag q 0.1 1 0.75 Vegetable Rack c 0.4 0.4 0.7
Underwater q 1 0.65 0.6 Broom c 0.55 0.4 0.625
Baseball Bat c 0.2 1 1 Rolling Pin c 0.45 1 1
Bathing Costume q 1 0.8 0.8 Table Mat q 0.25 0.4 0.325
Sailing Life Jacket c 1 0.8 1 Whisk c 1 1 1
Ballet Shoes q 0.7 0.6 0.6 Blender c 1 1 1
Hoola Hoop q 0.1 0.6 0.5 Electric Toothbrush q 0.8 0 0.55
Running Shoes c 1 1 1 Frying Pan q 0.7 1 0.95
Cricket Pitch q 0 0.5 0.525 Toaster c 1 1 1
Tennis Racket c 0.2 1 1 Spatula c 0.55 0.9 0.95
nonempty collection σ(Ω) of subsets of Ω that is closed under complementation and countable unions of
its members. Measure spaces are the most general structures devised by mathematicians and physicists to
represent weights.
3 Geometrical characterization of membership weights
We now develop the geometric language that makes it possible to verify the existence of a normed measure
representation for a set of weights. For this purpose we introduce the ‘classical disjunction polytope’ dc (n, S)
in the following way. We construct an n+ |S| dimensional ‘classical disjunction vector’
−→p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn, . . . , pi∨j , . . .)
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where |S| is the cardinality of S. We consider the linear space R (n, S) ∼= Rn+|S| consisting of all real vectors
of this type. Next, let ε ∈ {0, 1}n be an arbitrary n-dimensional vector consisting of 0 and 1’s. For each ε
we construct the classical disjunction vector −→v ε ∈ R (n, S) by putting:
vεi = εi i = 1, . . . , n
vεij = max (εi, εj) = εi + εj − εiεj (i, j) ∈ S
The set of convex linear combinations of −→v ε we call the ‘classical disjunction polytope’ dc (n, S) :
dc (n, S) =
−→w ∈ R (n, S) | −→w = ∑
ε∈{0,1}n
λε
−→v ε;λε ≥ 0;
∑
ε∈{0,1}n
λε = 1

We prove now the following theorem
Theorem 3.1 The set of weights
pi = µ(Ai) i = 1, 2, . . . , n; pi∨j = µ(Ai or Aj) (i, j) ∈ S
admits a normed measure space, and hence is a classical disjunction set of membership weights, if and only
if its disjunction vector −→p belongs to the classical disjunction polytope dc (n, S).
Proof: Suppose that (4) is a classical disjunction set of weights, and hence we have a normed measure space
(Ω, σ(Ω), P ) and events EAi ∈ σ(Ω) such that (5) are satisfied. Let us show that in this case −→p ∈ dc (n, S).
For an arbitrary subset X ⊂ Ω we define X1 = X and X0 = Ω\X. Consider  = (1, . . . , n) ∈ {0, 1}n and
define A() = ∩Aii . Then we have that A() ∩A(′) = ∅ for  6= ′, ∪A() = Ω, and ∪,j=1A() = Aj . We
put now λ = P (A()). Then we have λ ≥ 0 and
∑
 λ = 1, and pi = P (Ai) =
∑
,i=1
λ =
∑
 λi. We
also have pi∨j = P (Ai ∪ Aj) =
∑
,max(i,j)=1
λ =
∑
 λ (i + j − ij). This means that −→p =
∑
 λv
,
which shows that −→p ∈ dc (n, S). Conversely, suppose that −→p ∈ dc (n, S). Then there exist numbers
λ ≥ 0 such that
∑
 λ = 1 and
−→p = ∑ λv. We define Ω = {0, 1}n and σ(Ω) the power set of
Ω. For X ⊂ Ω we define then P (X) = ∑∈X λ. Then we choose Ai = {, i = 1} which gives that
P (Ai) =
∑
 λi =
∑
 λv

i = pi and P (Ai ∪ Aj) =
∑
 λ (i + j − ij) =
∑
 λv

ij = pi∨j . This shows
that we have a classical disjunction set of weights. QED
As one may notice, these results are very similar to those of Pitowsky for classical conjunction polytopes
c (n, S) [47]. However, the Pitowsky correlation polytope and the classical disjunction polytope have different
sets of vertices. Furthermore, the interpretation of the |S| components is completely different, namely rep-
resenting conjunction data pij and disjunction data pi∨j respectively. In general, the existence of a classical
disjunctive representation does not necessarily imply the existence of a classical conjunctive representation,
and vice versa. Therefore, in order to fully grasp classicality by these geometric means, the natural next
step is to combine the theoretical results for conjunction (Pitowsky) and disjunction polytopes (developed
here and in [15]) by introducing a ‘classical connective polytope’.
Again, let ε ∈ {0, 1}n be an arbitrary n-dimensional vector consisting of 0 and 1’s. For each ε we
construct the classical connective vector −→w ε ∈ Rn+|S|+|S′| by putting:
wεi = εi i = 1, . . . , n
wεij = εiεj = min (εi, εj) (i, j) ∈ S
wεk∨l = εk + εl − εkεl = max (εk, εl) (k, l) ∈ S′
The set of convex linear combinations of −→w ε we call the ‘classical connective polytope’ k(n, S, S′):
k(n, S, S′) = {−→f ∈ Rn+|S|+|S′| | −→f =
∑
∈{0,1}n
λ
−→w ; λ ≥ 0;
∑
∈{0,1}n
λ = 1} (6)
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Theorem 3.2 The set of weights
pi = µ(Ai) i = 1, 2, . . . , n; pij = µ(Ai and Aj) (i, j) ∈ S; pi∨j = µ(Ai or Aj) (i, j) ∈ S′
admits a normed measure space, and hence is a classical set of membership weights, if and only if its
connective vector −→p belongs to the classical connective polytope k(n, S, S′).
Proof: Follows from the theorems for conjunction and disjunction classicality.
4 A simple case: disjunction effect for 2 concepts
One of the authors studied the disjunction effect for the case of two concepts and their disjunction [15]. We
recall Theorem 4 of [15].
Theorem 4.1 The membership weights µ(A), µ(B) and µ(A or B) of an item X with respect to concepts A
and B and their disjunction ‘A or B’ are classical disjunction data if and only if they satisfy the following
‘classical disjunction’ inequalities:
0 ≤ µ(A) ≤ µ(A or B) ≤ 1 (7)
0 ≤ µ(B) ≤ µ(A or B) ≤ 1 (8)
0 ≤ µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A or B) (9)
Proof: See [15].
In the case of two concepts A1, A2 and their disjunction ‘A1 or A2’ the set of indices is S = {(1, 2)} and
the classical disjunction polytope dc (n, S) is contained in the 2 + |S| = 3 dimensional Euclidean space, i.e.
R(2, {1, 2}) = R3. Furthermore we have four vectors  ∈ {0, 1}n, namely (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1), and
hence the four vectors −→v  ∈ R3 which are the following
−→v (0,0) = (0, 0, 0) −→v (1,0) = (1, 0, 1) −→v (0,1) = (0, 1, 1) −→v (1,1) = (1, 1, 1) (10)
This means that the correlation polytope dc (n, S) is the convex region spanned by the convex combi-
nations of the vectors (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1), and the disjunction vector is given by −→p =
(µ(A1), µ(A2), µ(A1 or A2)). It is well-known that every polytope admits two dual descriptions: one in
terms of convex combinations of its vertices, and one in terms of the inequalities that define its boundaries.
Following [15], the inequalities defining the boundaries for the polytope dc (2, {(1, 2)}) are given by:
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p1∨2 ≤ 1 (11)
0 ≤ p2 ≤ p1∨2 ≤ 1 (12)
0 ≤ p1 + p2 − p1∨2 ≤ 1 (13)
We observe that the last inequality p1 + p2 − p1∨2 ≤ 1 follows easily because from p1 ≤ p1∨2 and p2 ≤ p1∨2
follows that p1 + p2 − p1∨2 ≤ p1∨2 ≤ 1 (again because of (11)).
Theorem 4.2 The classical disjunction inequalities formulated in theorem 4.1. are satisfied if and only if−→p ∈ dc (2, {(1, 2)}) .
Proof: Let us notice that
−→p =
 p1p2
p1∨2
 = (1− p1∨2)
 00
0
+ (p1∨2 − p1)
 01
1
+ (p1∨2 − p2)
 10
1
+ (p1 + p2 − p1∨2)
 11
1

= a
 00
0
+ b
 01
1
+ c
 10
1
+ d
 11
1

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Hence if the classical disjunction inequalities formulated in theorem 4.1 are satisfied, then it is easy to check
that −→p ∈ dc (2, {(1, 2)}) .Vice versa, let −→p ∈ dc (2, {(1, 2)}) . Rewriting −→p as above, and putting condition
0 ≤ a, b, c, d ≤ 1 immediately follow the classical disjunction inequalities of theorem 4.1:
0 ≤ 1− p1∨2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ p1∨2 − p1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ p1∨2 − p2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ p1 + p2 − p1∨2 ≤ 1
The last inequality is condition (13), while 0 ≤ 1− p1∨2 ⇒ p1∨2 ≤ 1. Also 0 ≤ p1∨2 − p1 ⇒ p1 ≤ p1∨2. Also,
0 ≤ p1 + p2 − p1∨2 implies that p1∨2 − p2 ≤ p1 and since 0 ≤ p1∨2 − p2 follows that 0 ≤ p1∨2 − p2 ≤ p1 so
0 ≤ p1. Putting these together, we obtain then 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p1∨2 ≤ 1. Similarly, we can prove 0 ≤ p2 ≤ p1∨2 ≤ 1.
QED.
Let us consider the experimental data in Table 1. In the first part of Figure 1 we have represented the
disjunction vectors formed by the membership weights of the different items to be found in Table 1 with
respect to the pairs of concepts Home Furnishings and Furniture and their disjunction ‘Home Furnishings or
Furniture’, and also the disjunction polytope. The classical items, hence with disjunction vector inside the
polytope, are represented by a little open disk. They are Desk, Bed, Rug, Wall-Hangings, Shelves, Sculpture,
Bath Tub, Door Bell and Desk Chair. The non classical items, hence with disjunction vector outside of
the polytope, are represented by a little closed disk. They are Lamp, Wall Mirror, Window Seat, Painting,
Light Fixture, Mantelpiece, Refrigerator, Space Rack, Sink Unit, Waste Paper Basket, Kitchen Count, Bar,
Hammock, Ashtray and Park Bench.
In the second part of Figure 1 we have represented the disjunction vectors formed by the membership
weights of the different items found in Table 1 with respect to the pairs of concepts Spices and Herbs and
their disjunction ‘Spices or Herbs’, and the disjunction polytope. The classical items, hence with disjunction
vector inside the polytope, are again represented by a little open disk. They are Parsley, Mint, Pepper,
Cinnamon, Peppermint, Sesame Seeds, Poppyseeds, Molasses and Chocolate. The non classical items, hence
with disjunction vector outside of the polytope, are again represented by a little closed disk. They are Chires,
Oregano, Chili Pepper, Mustard, Horseradish, Turmeric, Root Ginger, Salt, Curry, MSG, Vinegar, Vanilla,
Lemon Juice, Sugar and Saccharin.
In the first part of Figure 2 we have represented the disjunction vectors formed by the membership weights
of the different items to be found in Table 1 with respect to the pairs of concepts Hobbies and Games and
their disjunction ‘Hobbies or Games’, and also the disjunction polytope. The classical items, hence with
disjunction vector inside the polytope, are represented by a little open disk. They are Monopoly, Tennis,
Bridge, Bowling, Fishing, Theatre Going, Gardening and Guitar Playing. The non classical items, hence
with disjunction vector outside of the polytope, are represented by a little closed disk. They are Noughts,
Archery, Skating, Karate, Judo, Keep Fit, Jogging, Autograph Hunting, Discuss Throwing, Rock Climbing,
Camping, Stamp Collection, Wrestling, Beer Drinking, Washing Dishes and Eating Ice-Cream Cones.
In the second part of Figure 2 we have represented the disjunction vectors formed by the membership
weights of the different items found in Table 1 with respect to the pairs of concepts Games and Instruments
and their disjunction ‘Games or Instruments’, and the disjunction polytope. The classical items, hence with
disjunction vector inside the polytope, are represented by a little open disk. They are Pliers, Tin Opener,
Paint Brush, Meat Thermometer, Tuning Fork, Stapler, Magnetic Compass and Toothbrush. The non classical
items, hence with disjunction vector outside of the polytope, are represented by a little closed disk. They
are Pen-Knife, Scalpel, Scissors, Bicycle Pump, Step Ladder, Spoon, Door Key, Measuring Calipers, Paper
Clip, Computer, Pencil Eraser, Broom, Sellotape, Rubber Band, Goggles and Skate Board.
In the first part of Figure 3 we have represented the disjunction vectors formed by the membership
weights of the different items to be found in Table 1 with respect to the pairs of concepts Pets and Farmyard
Animals and their disjunction ‘Pets or Farmyard Animals’, and also the disjunction polytope. The classical
items, hence with disjunction vector inside the polytope, are represented by a little open disk. They are Colie
Dog, Race Horse, Spider, Robin and Blue Tit. The non classical items, hence with disjunction vector outside
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of the polytope, are represented by a little closed disk. They are Chicken, Ginger Tom-Cat, Prize Bull, Cart
Horse, Donkey, Doberman Guard Dog, Siamese Cat, Goldfish, Rat, Guide Dog fro the Blind, Homing Pig,
Field Mouse, Fox, Husky in Sledream, Badger, Circus Horse, Monkey, Squirrel and Camel.
In the second part of Figure 3 we have represented the disjunction vectors formed by the membership
weights of the different items found in Table 1 with respect to the pairs of concepts Fruits and Vegetables
and their disjunction ‘Fruits or Vegetables’, and the disjunction polytope. The classical items, hence with
disjunction vector inside the polytope, are again represented by a little open disk. They are Pumpkin,
Tomato, Yam, Green Pepper, Apple, Chili Pepper, Peanut and Black Pepper. The non classical items, hence
with disjunction vector outside of the polytope, are again represented by a little closed disk. They are
Broccoli, Mushroom, Watercress, Coconut, Raisin, Olive, Elderberry, Lentils, Root Ginger, Garlic, Parsley,
Almond, Rice, Acorn, Wheat and Mustard.
In the first part of Figure 4 we have represented the disjunction vectors formed by the membership
weights of the different items to be found in Table 1 with respect to the pairs of concepts Sportswear and
Sports Equipment and their disjunction ‘Sportswear or Sports Equipment’, and also the disjunction polytope.
The classical items, hence with disjunction vector inside the polytope, are represented by a little open disk.
They are Golf Ball, Tennis Racket, Baseball Bat, American Foot, Rubber Flipper, Running Shoes, Sailing
Life Jacket, Backpack and Cheerleaders. The non classical items, hence with disjunction vector outside of the
polytope, are represented by a little closed disk. They are Diving Mask, Wrist Sweat, Frisbee, Gymnasium,
Lineman’s Flag, Ballet Shoes, Motorcycle Helmet, Bathing Costume, Underwater, Hoola Hoop, Cricket Pitch,
Referee’s Whistle, Sunglasses, Circus Clowns and Suntan Lotion.
In the second part of Figure 4 we have represented the disjunction vectors formed by the membership
weights of the different items found in Table 1 with respect to the pairs of concepts Household Appliances
and Kitchen Utensils and their disjunction ‘Household Appliances or Kitchen Utensils’, and the disjunction
polytope. The classical items, hence with disjunction vector inside the polytope, are again represented by a
little open disk. They are Rolling Pin, Carving Knife, Whisk, Food Processor, Blender, Toaster, Spatula, Cake
Tin, Cooking Stove, Rubbish Bin, Vacuum Cleaner, Vegetable Rack, Broom and Apron. The non classical
Figure 1: The polytopes for the concepts Home Furnishing and Furniture and the concepts Spices and Herbs.
The classical items correspond to an open disk while the quantum ones to a full disk.
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Figure 2: The polytopes for the concepts Hobbies and Games and the concepts Instruments and Tools. The
classical items correspond to an open disk while the quantum ones to a full disk.
Figure 3: The polytopes for the concepts Pets and Farmyard Animals and the concepts Fruits and Vegetables.
The classical items correspond to an open disk while the quantum ones to a full disk.
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Figure 4: The polytopes for the concepts Sportswear and Sports Equipment and the concepts Household
Appliances and Kitchen Utensils. The classical items correspond to an open disk while the quantum ones to
a full disk.
items, hence with disjunction vector outside of the polytope, are again represented by a little closed disk.
They are Fork, Frying Pan, Chopping Board, Freezer, Extractor Fan, Iron, Television, Electric Toothbrush,
Table Mat and Hat Stand.
Remark that if the experimental data turn out such that the item is a classical item, this does not mean
that perhaps non classical effect are at play also for this item. But the non classical effect might be such
that they do not show up with these particular measurements. This aspect of the situation is analyzed in
more detail in [15].
The inequalities that define the boundaries of polytope dc (n, S) are a variant of the well-known Bell
inequalities [28, 47], studied in the foundations of quantum mechanics, but now put into the context of
disjunctive connectives instead of conjunctive correlations. This means that the violation of these inequalities,
such as it happens by the data corresponding to items for which the points lie outside the polytope, has from
a probabilistic perspective an analogous meaning as the violation of Bell inequalities for the conjunction.
Hence these violations may indicate the presence of quantum structures in the domain where the data is
collected, which makes it plausible that a quantum model, such as for example the one proposed in [15], can
be used to model the data.
As we have shown above, the classical disjunction polytope allows for one necessary and sufficient con-
dition −→p ∈ dc (n, S) which guarantees a classical Kolmogorovian model for the given set of probabilities to
exist [41]. As illustrated here, this can be expressed by a set of Bell-like inequalities. However, as Pitowsky
remarked [47], the number and complexity of the inequalities will grow so fast with n, that it would require
exponentially many computation steps to derive them all. Anyway, already for the simplest (non-trivial)
case n = 2 interesting inequalities can be derived by which the non classical nature of a set of statistical data
can be demonstrated explicitly. Such data exists in various fields of science: of course in quantum mechanics,
but also in cognition (concept) theory, decision theory and some paradoxical situations in economics, such as
in the Allais and Ellsberg paradox situations [71, 72], notably situations which violate Savage’s ‘Sure-Thing
principle’ [70].
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